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Title IX of the Education Reformation Act was passed in 1972 for the purpose of providing equality 
between males and females in intercollegiate sports.  Since its inception the disparity between men’s 
and women’s varsity athletics programs has persisted throughout American colleges and 
universities.  Discrimination and equal protection concerns define the continuing debate of gender 
equality under the Act.  Campuses across the Nation have seen athletic departments add women’s 
varsity sport programs and cut men’s programs in order to remain compliant under the Act.  This 
paper explores the equal protection concerns of proportionality amongst enrollment rates and 
participation rates in intercollegiate athletics.  The state of Title IX today remains clouded with 
questions by college administrators who, after over three decades of enforcement, are employing 
proportionality concepts as a measure to obtain gender equality in sports.  The proportionality 
practice of cutting men’s programs instead of adding women’s programs may undermine the 
purpose of Title IX.  This paper is an analysis of the Court decisions and lawsuits that characterize 
the controversy of Title IX and its legal application to claims of gender bias associated with female 
athletic programs.  The study of this concern is imperative and will shape how college athletic 





niversities and colleges across the country debate every year what should happen with men’s and 
women’s athletic teams at their institutions of higher learning.  The decisions are different in college 
than they are for high school interscholastic programs because the colleges actually produce revenue 
from certain sporting events.  Particularly, football and basketball are large ticket items for men’s programs, but, more 
recently, women’s basketball and volleyball have actually produced revenue for the college.   
 
Title IX is an Act created in 1972 under the Education Amendments which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sex in federally funded programs.  When intercollegiate athletics is involved, the office of civil rights (OCR) 
has interpreted Title IX to require schools to provide their male and female students with varsity athletic opportunities 
in proportion to their numbers in the undergraduate population.  This requirement is known as proportionality.  
Proportionality has become the gold standard for whether a college’s varsity athletic offerings comply with Title IX’s 
equal opportunity mandate.  The proportionality requirement, however, has received much criticism and scholars have 
attacked sex-based proportionality for slots on college teams as inconsistent with Title IX’s non-discrimination 
mandate, because the rule gives female students a competitive advantage.
1
   
                                                 
1 Earl C. Dudley, Jr. and George Rutherglen, Ironies, Inconsistencies and Intercollegiate Athletics: Title IX, Title IV, and Statistical 
Evidence of Discrimination, 1 VA. J. Sports and L. 177, 213-214 (1999) (postulating that Title IX’s proportionality requirement is 
simply a form of affirmative action imposing on universities an obligation to compensate for “societal discrimination”); William E. 
U 
Journal of Diversity Management – Second Quarter 2007                                                             Volume 2, Number 2 
 26 
Much criticism is made of the proportionality requirement imprinted in Title IX, because it interferes with 
Title VII’s mandate of equal protection between classes.  In this instance, it is the class of boys and girls or males and 
females.  This paper examines proportionality concerns for men and women student athletes.  Women’s sports at the 
college level are put in the model of careers-open-to-talents, where men and women compete for jobs that are awarded 
based on relevant talents and abilities.  Proportionality is simply a one-man (person), one vote principle that 
guarantees female students proportional varsity athletic positions even when they have lower levels of athletic interest 
and ability than do male students.
2
  The issue is whether Title IX funding in intercollegiate athletic programs should 





Equal Protection And Gender Equity Under Title IX 
 
Clearly, Title IX conflicts with the equal protection clause as is shown in Cohen v. Brown University, 123 
Educ. L. Rep. 1013, 1025 (1998), which addressed whether the proportionality requirement violates the equal 
protection clause, because it does not distribute rewards based on individual interest and ability.   
 
Initially, it is important to examine the concept of Gender Equity as it applies to educational athletics 
programs.
4
  The issue of gender equity is addressed in most aspects of society.  It is especially important in sports.  
Equality is the quality or state of being equal.
5
  This should be consistent for males and females in sports.  Gender is a 
property of certain words whereby they indicate the sex or lack of sex, which they represent.
6
  Gender equity ensures 
the equality for both sexes.  The equal rights amendment required public schools to permit girls to participate with 
boys in all interscholastic sports, but many cases challenged this idea.
7
   
 
The primary reason more girls and women participate in sport today is that there are more opportunities than 
ever before.  Girls and women still do not receive an equal share of sport resources in most organizational 
communities.  Although female participation is not up to par, government regulations have mandated females be 
represented in more and more organizations.  Congress contributed to the fairness in sports by passing Title IX in the 
Education Reform Act of 1972.
8
  This title expressed that no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational 
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.  This means females are allowed to play in sports in 
educational institutions.  Title IX not only requires equal opportunities for participation, but equal treatment and 
benefits for athletes with intercollegiate programs.  Violations of the law will produce actions for injunctive relief and 
even for monetary damages. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
Thro and Brian A. Snow, The Conflict Between The Equal Protection Clause and Cohen v. Brown University, 123 Educ. L. Rep. 
1013, 1025 (1998) (proportionality requirement violates equal protection clause). 
2 Eugene G. Bernardo, II, Note, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Title IX and Cohen v. Brown University, 2 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 
305, 348 (1997) (discrimination should be found under Title IX only if female students are underrepresented on varsity athletic 
teams given the percentage of women in the group of students who are interested and able to play varsity athletics); Walter B. 
Connally, Jr. and Jeffrey D. Adelman, A Universities’ Defense To a Title IX Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never 
Intended Gender Equity Based On Student Body Ratios, 71 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 845, 904-905 (1994) (criticizing proportionality 
requirement for Title IX liability to comparisons of women’s athletic participants with a number of women in the student body 
rather than with the “qualified pool” of female students in keeping with the model for liability established by Title VII  cases). 
3 Ross A. Jeurewitz, Comment, Playing at Even Strength: Reforming Title IX Enforcement in Intercollegiate and athletics, 8 M.U.J. 
Gender Soc. Pol’ynl. 283, 348 (2000) (“although Title IX is significantly patterned after Title IV and other civil rights amendments, 
the courts have refused to look at Title IV’s case law for juris prudential guidance”); see Dudley and Rutherglen, supra note 2 at 
207-10 (Title IX should follow Title IV case law for how to establish discrimination based on statistics). 
4 Diane Hackman, “The Glass Sneaker: 30 years of victories and defeats involving Title IX and sex discrimination in athletics,” 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal, 556 (Winter 2003). 
5 Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Publishing Co. 1999.  
6 Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, West Publishing Co. 1999.  
7 ALR 3d, Vol. 90, Pg. 213. 
8 United States Code Annoted, 1995 Ed., Title 29 205d. 
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Schools which provided stipends under the proposal would have to provide stipends for a proportionate 
number of women athletes.  Also, if female students are underrepresented in athletics, their interests must be 
accommodated unless the institution can show continuous expansion of sports programs.  That is, an institution does 
not have to create more opportunities for females, but can reduce those for males in order to be equal.  Title IX has 
been a movement towards gender equity in schools. 
 
Females also have to deal with finding employment in sports and receiving adequate pay.  The Equal Pay 
Act
9
 requires that employers give equal pay for equal work.  It specifically states an employer cannot pay an employee 
of one sex less than is paid to an employee of another sex where both perform equal work under similar working 
conditions on jobs requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility.  The employee looking for relief under the act must 
show that the employer pays a higher wage to the opposite sex for equal skill or effort.  The institution then must 




Recent Title IX Cases 
 
The case of Pederson v. LSU
11
 is typical of recent cases that strictly apply proportionality to find a violation 
of the Act.  Pederson petitioned for an en banc rehearing that was denied in part, and granted in part to extent that the 
court vacated its original opinion and issued a new opinion that is virtually identical.  In its revised opinion, the court 
again applied the proportionality test in determining whether LSU had violated Title IX.  Using this test the Fifth 
Circuit held that LSU was in violation of Title IX because the student population at LSU was 49% female, while 
athletic participation was only 29% female.  The court again found that LSU’s differential treatment of women was 
sufficient to establish an intentional violation of Title IX.  Pederson v. LSU mirrored the decision in Pederson v. 
LSU.
12
  On January 27, 2000, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Louisiana federal district court’s 
decision and held that Louisiana State University intentionally violated Title IX. 
 
Beth Pederson, Lisa Ollar, and Samantha Clark alleged that LSU violated Title IX by not establishing a 
women’s soccer team.  Pederson also wished to establish a putative class consisting of “those female students enrolled 
at LSU since 1993” who wanted, but were not allowed to participate in varsity women’s fast-pitched softball team. 
 
LSU argued that it did not violate Title IX since a proportionality test could not be used when considering 
violations of the stature.  LSU also disputed Pederson’s creation of a putative class.  Finally LSU argued that even if it 
had violated Title IX, any such violation was unintentional. 
 
In addressing these issues, the district court held that a proportionality test could be used to determine 
whether LSU violated Title IX.  The court held that since the student population at LSU was 49% female, while 
athletic participation was only 29% female, LSU was in violation of Title IX, a decision that the Fifth Circuit upheld. 
 
The Fifth Circuit did, however, reverse the district court’s holding that LSU’s violation was not intentional.  
The Fifth Circuit held that although LSU may have ignorantly violated Title IX, it need not have intended to violate 
Title IX, but need only have intended to treat women differently.  The court relied on statements made by university 
employees, particularly LSU’s athletic director, to determine that LSU intentionally treated women differently. 
 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit also reversed the lower court’s ruling decertifying Pederson’s putative class.  The 
court held that a class consisting of potential female student athletes who were not given the opportunity to compete in 
varsity intercollegiate athletics met the necessary requirements for a putative class as set forth by the class action Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
                                                 
9 United States Code Annoted, 1995 Ed., Title 29 206d. 
10 Marquette Law Review, Vol. 9 Pg. 175. 
11 Pederson v. LSU, 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000). 
12 Pederson v. LSU, 201 F. 3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000) 
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In summary, the Fifth Circuit held that since LSU did not provide women with the same athletic 
opportunities as it did men, the school intentionally treated women differently.  In doing so, the school intentionally 
violated Title IX.   
 




On December 15, 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a California federal court’s decision 
granting a preliminary injunction and held that reducing the number of athletic scholarships for an over-represented 
gender is a suitable way for a university to comply with Title IX. 
 
Because the percentage of athletic scholarships given to women was significantly less than the percentage of 
female undergraduates enrolled in the school, California State University – Bakersfield reduced the number of 
scholarships for its men’s wrestling team.  The men’s program sought a preliminary injunction preventing the 
reduction and claimed “gender-conscious remedies are appropriate only when necessary to ensure that schools provide 
opportunities to males and females in proportion to their relative levels of interest in sports participation.”14  However, 
the Board of Trustees argued that such a reduction is appropriate to correct an imbalance in the number of athletic 
scholarships given to a gender as compared to the percentage of students comprised by that gender. 
 
The Ninth Circuit relied on Cohen v. Brown University,
15
 which upheld a preliminary injunction ordering 
Brown to reinstate its women’s gymnastics and volleyball programs in order to comply with Title IX.  The Cohen 
court held that keeping the number of scholarships offered for each gender proportionate to the number of students of 
each gender is a safe harbor that a university can use to comply with Title IX.  Further, Cohen noted that a gender’s 
level of interest in participating in athletics need only be considered if a university does not keep scholarships 
proportional to enrollment and does not show a history of expanding programs to meet a gender’s interest and 
abilities.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “adopting Neal’s interest-based test for Title IX compliance would hinder, 
and quite possibly reverse, the steady increases in women’s participation and interest in sports that have followed Title 
IX’s enactment.”16  The Ninth Circuit held that reducing men’s athletic scholarships is a proper way for a university to 
comply with Title IX. 
 




 On August 19, 1997, eleven female student-athletes brought suit under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 against the Virginia High School League (VHSL).  The student-athletes alleged that the VHSL 
denied certain female athletes opportunities to participate in athletics based on their sex in violation of Title IX and the 
Equal Protection Clause of Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution. 
 
 The plaintiffs asserted that the VHSL’s scheduling practices treated boys’ sports differently than girls’ sports, 
while at the same time forced some girls to stop playing sports that they previously were able to play while no boys 
were forced to stop playing sports because of schedule changes.  The plaintiffs further alleged that the current 
classifications system deprived girls of opportunities to play all sports of their preference and hindered opportunities 
for college athletic scholarships. 
 
 Virginia schools compete in classifications designated A, AA, or AAA, based on enrollment sizes.  Because 
enrollment fluctuates, some schools change classifications when the league adjusts the grouping every two years.  
However, the classification system is treated differently among boys’ and girls’ sports.  The sport seasons for girls 
differ across classifications.  AAA schools play basketball in the winter, while A and AA schools compete in the fall.  
Therefore, if an AAA school is reclassified as AA, a basketball player accustomed to running cross-country, a fall 
                                                 
13 Neal v. Board of Trustees of the California State Universities, 198 F. 3d 763 (9th Circ. 1999) 
14 Id. at 767 
15 Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F. 2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). 
16 Id. at 767. 
17 Alston v. Virginia High School League Inc., 134 Ed Law Rep 180 (W.D. Va. 2000). 
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sport would have to choose between cross-country and basketball.  Conversely, boys’ sports are played in the same 
seasons regardless of classification. 
 
 Before the trial, the plaintiffs sought class action certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Class certification is a case-by-case analysis; there are no legal claims that automatically bind the 
court to certify any and every class bringing those claims.  The plaintiffs proposed class definition included all present 
and future female students enrolled in Virginia public schools who participate in interscholastic athletics. 
 
 In order to receive class certification, the plaintiffs had to satisfy the requirements set forth in Rule 23.  
Under this rule, one or more members of a class may sue as a representative party on behalf of all only if (1) the class 
is so numerous the joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
 
 Only two of the prerequisites to class certification were contested:  typicality and adequacy.  Both 
requirements look to the potential for conflicts in the class.  In examining the adequacy requirement, the court 
attempted to uncover conflicts between the named parties and the class they sought to represent.  The court also 
wanted to see if the named parties possessed the same interest and suffered the same injury as the class members.  In 
examining the typicality requirement, the court wanted to ensure that only those plaintiffs who advance the same 
factual and legal arguments were grouped together as a class. 
 
 The court was presented with evidence of a conflict of interests between the named plaintiffs and other 
members of the class, which precluded certification under Rule 23.  A survey presented by the VHSL indicated that 
the plaintiffs did not adequately represent the interests of all members of their class and that plaintiffs’ claims were not 
typical of their class.  A majority of the female student-athletes who responded to the survey expressed a desire to 
maintain the current system.  This conflict prevented the plaintiffs from satisfying the typicality requirement as well as 
the adequacy of representation requirement.  Therefore, the requested relief would not benefit all other persons subject 
to the practice under attack, as required in a class action. 
 
 After the request for class certification was denied, the plaintiffs proposed a narrower sub-class.  The 
narrower class would consist of all present and future student-athletes enrolled in Virginia public schools who were 
forced to choose between or among sports because of the VHSL’s discriminatory scheduling practices.  However, the 
plaintiffs also failed to meet their burden for the narrow sub-class.  As a result the court declined to certify the 
narrower sub-class. 
 
 The court would allow the suit to go forth with the plaintiffs as representatives only of themselves. 
 




 On March 20, 2000, in a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 
Kentucky High School Athletic Associations (KHSAA) did not violate Title IX when it refused to sanction girls’ fast-
pitch softball.  This is the Sixth Circuit’s second review of the case.  Initially, the court reversed the judgment for the 
KHSAA on Horner’s Title IX claim finding that issues of fact “abound[ed]” and remanded the case to the district 
court. 
 
 Lorie Ann Horner, along with eleven other plaintiffs, sued the KHSAA alleging it violated Title IX by not 
sanctioning girls’ fast-pitch softball while sanctioning boys’ baseball, the male equivalent sport.  The basis for 
Horner’s complaint was that “KHSAA’s failure to sponsor fast-pitch softball for female students diminished the 
ability of female student athletes to compete for college fast-pitch softball athletic scholarships when compared with 
male student athletes who played high school baseball and then competed for college baseball athletic scholarships.”19 
                                                 
18 Homer v. Kentucky High School Athletic Association, 206 F. 3d 685 (6th Cir. 2000) 
19 Id. at 687. 
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 Before the case was heard on remand, the Kentucky Legislature amended “if a member school sponsors or 
intends to sponsor an athletic activity that is similar to a sport for which NCAA members offer an athletic scholarship, 
the school shall sponsor the athletic activity or sport for which the scholarships are offered.  The athletic activities 
which are similar to sports for which NCAA members offer scholarships are: Girls’ fast-pitch softball as compared to 
slow pitch. 
 
 The Sixth Circuit first noted that girls’ opportunities were more limited than boys’.  The Sixth Circuit then 
addressed whether or not the KHSAA intentionally discriminated against women by not sanctioning girls’ fast-pitch 
softball.  The court held that because “plaintiffs offered no proof on remand that their interests were not being met, 
despite allowing them to play on boys’ fast-pitch softball teams,”20 they failed to show that any Title IX mandate had 
been violated at all, let alone intentionally.  In making this determination, the majority granted summary judgment for 
KHSAA by applying a “discriminatory animus” standard that looks to whether an entity’s actions focus upon women 
by reason of their sex and are directed specifically at women as a class.  The court found that Horner did not present 
any evidence to show an intentional violation of Title IX, and therefore, she had no claim against the KHSAA. 
 




 Sandra Ortiz-Del Valle’s goal was to become the first female referee in the NBA, as she was the first female 
referee to officiate a men’s pro game, a USBL game in 1991.  She refereed a few preseason New Jersey Nets 
scrimmages in 1992, but despite her credentials, was passed over repeatedly for an NBA referee position.  The league 
gave her varying reasons for denying her a job, which Ortiz-Del Valle’s lawyers called a pretext for discrimination. 
 
 She brought suit against the NBA on the grounds of gender discrimination in violation of the Title VII.  Last 
spring a jury validated her claim awarding her $100,000.00 in damages for lost wages, $750,000.00 for emotional 
distress and $7 million in punitive damages.  The judgment against the NBA marked the first time that the league had 
ever lost a discrimination suit. 
 
 The NBA moved for judgment as a matter of law or alternatively, for a new trial.  The court denied the 
motion on the condition that the defendant accept reduced damages of $250,000 in punitive damages, $76,926.20 in 
lost wages, and $20,000 in emotional distress.  The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that 
Ortiz-Del Valle was discriminated against; however, it felt that the damages were excessive. 
 
 As to the emotional distress award, the court concluded that a remitter was proper because there was virtually 
no evidence of Ortiz-Del Valle needing or having undergone any counseling or psychiatric treatment or of the 
duration of the mental anguish, its severity or its consequences, that would support the $750,000.00 award. 
 
 The court reduced the amount of back pay owed Ortiz Del-Valle from $100,000.00 to $76,926.20.  The new 
amount is the dollar amount she would have earned more as an NBA referee from 1994-1997 than she actually earned 
from other sources.  Ortiz-Del Valle claims that the original $100,000 award was based on a jury award of interest on 
the $76,926.20.  However, there was no evidence to support this claim. 
 
 The biggest reduction in the verdict came in the punitive damages portion of the award, where damages, were 
decreased to $250,000.00, from $7 million.  The court simply found the number to be excessive, finding the ratio of 
58.3 times the remitted amount of compensatory damages to be too high. 
 
 The NBA plans to appeal the latest decision, as it is still baffled by the court’s decision.  Before the start of 
the 1997-98 season, the NBA hired two female officials, Violet Palmer and Dee Kanter.  Both women testified that 
they had been hired on merit and that they did not believe the league discriminated.  NBA officials do not understand 
how a court can claim that the league discriminates against women becoming officials when they have the only female 
                                                 
20 Id. at 696. 
21 Ortiz-Del Valle v. National Basketball Association, 42 F. Supp 2d 334 (S.D. NY, 1999) 
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officials in the four major sports.  However, the timing of the hiring is conspicuous, coming after the charge was filed 
and before trial. 
 




 Marianne Stanley sued the University of Southern California (USC) for sex discrimination and retaliatory 
discharge in connection with a contract dispute over her salary as head women’s basketball coach.  Stanley alleged 
that her salary was not comparable to that of head men’s basketball coach George Raveling and that she was 
discriminated against and discharged from her coaching position because of her complaint about this unequal pay.  
After various decisions in the case beginning in 1993, the dispute made its way to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
The Ninth Circuit initially reviewed Stanley’s Equal Pay Act claim.  As the court explained, Stanley has the 
burden of establishing a prima facia case by showing that employees of the opposite sex are paid lower wages for 
equal work.  To prevail she had to show that the jobs of head women’s and men’s basketball coach are “substantially 
equal.”  An analysis of whether the jobs are “substantially equal” focuses on (1) whether the jobs have a common core 
and are significantly identical, and (2) whether any additional tasks make one of the jobs substantially different. 
 
 While Stanley argued that her job was substantially equal to Raveling’s, the university argued that there are 
significant differences because the men’s coach bears greater revenue generating responsibility, is under greater media 
and spectator pressure, and generates more revenue for the school.  A defendant may rebut a prima facie case by 
showing that the disparity in pay is based on some factor other than sex.  The university demonstrated that Raveling 
has a greater experience level and much better coaching qualifications than Stanley does.  Nevertheless, Stanley could 
prevail by showing that the university’s explanation is actually an area of discrimination.  However, Stanley’s 
unsupported allegations show there was no differences in her qualifications or experience, and did not meet this 
minimal burden.  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decisions granting the university’s motion 
for summary judgment on the Equal Pay Act claim. 
 
 Because of this finding that Stanley did not show any discriminatory conduct on the part of the university, 
her claims under the Fair Employment Housing Act, Title IX, and the California Constitution also failed.  As to her 
retaliation claim, Stanley alleged that the university retaliated against her because she insisted that the USC honor its 
initial contract offer for a salary level equal to Raveling’s, and would not accept a future offer at a lower level.  
However, the court found that USC’s offer of a multi-year contract remained open and the university did not discharge 
her in response to any protected activity.  In fact, her contract had expired and she was unable to renegotiate a new 
contract. 
 
 Stanely also asserted that there was an express contract formed with USC based on an alleged initial offer of 
a contract at a salary level equal to Raveling.  However, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower courts that there was 
no evidence that there was a meeting of the minds regarding any such alleged offer and therefore, that no contract was 
formed. 
 
 Stanley then argued that an implied-in-fact employment contract existed under which USC led her to believe 
that she would be rewarded with a multi-year contract with equal pay for equal work if she produced a successful 
basketball program.  The court found no evidence that her express written contract was modified in this way. 
 
 Stanley also asserted that USC violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it failed to 
pay her a salary equal to Raveling’s.  The court held that such a claim requires proof of a valid contract, but that 
Stanley has no such contract upon which to base her claim.  For the foregoing reasons, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of USC. 
                                                 
22 Stanley v. University of Southern California, 178 F. 3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999) Court Denied 120 S. Ct. 533 (1999). 
 
Journal of Diversity Management – Second Quarter 2007                                                             Volume 2, Number 2 
 32 
 All of these cases show the constantly changing laws concerning gender equity in sports.  Males and females 
have en equal right to participate and be compensated for the involvement in sporting activities.  As society changes, 
there is a parallel movement in gender equity in sports. 
 
Proportionality v. Careers-Open-To-Talent 
 
Proportionality, as a way of leveling the playing field between men and women college athletics, was 
necessary in the first twenty years of Title IX’s development.  In l979, the Office of Civil Rights issued an 
interpretation named the “Policy Interpretation”, to set forth guidelines for satisfying Title IX’s equal opportunity 
mandate.  A three pronged test was devised and compliance by a college could be shown in any of three ways: 
 
1. A school provides athletic opportunities for its male and female students in numbers  substantially 
proportionate to their respective enrollments; 
2. Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, a school 
can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion, which is demonstratively responsive to the 
developing interest in abilities of the members of the underrepresented sex; 
3. Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot 
show a continuing practice of program expansion, the school can show that the interests and abilities of the 
members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. 
 
Proportionality has continued to be the primary ground for determining gender suits and disproportionate 
opportunities for women in college athletics which is based on the proportionate population of female students in the 
university or college.  Courts have routinely used this basic standard to rule that a college or university did not give 
proportionate funds or program support to women college sports in the particular sport challenged.  
 
The careers-open-to-talents model as an alternative concept is an excellent guide for equal opportunity in the 
workplace for male and female employees.  In has been argued that college athletics, as an industry, does not share 
many of the operational features of the workforce and is not a good playing field to look at dividing program funds for 
men’s and women’s college athletics.  Where jobs are awarded among interested parties on the basis of ability, the 
same test is not as easy in college athletics when men’s and women’s abilities are not the same and they are in 
segregated sports.  
 
CONCLUSION AND CASE SYNOPSIS 
 
 Proportionality is not justifiable as a meritocracy-based distribution model, but proportionality proponents 
really do not favor a meritocratic distribution of college varsity athletic slots along the careers-open-to-talents 
workforce model.  The critics of the proportionality requirement do not recommend an abandonment of sex-
segregated athletic teams.  Allocation of college athletic programs seems to be a distribution of sex-segregated varsity 
athletic positions between female and male students based on their relative levels of athletic interest and ability.  
Proportionality must be required to distribute athletic slots so as to maximize the actual participants in the first 
instance, because it is unlikely that each female student given the opportunity to play varsity athletics, because, 
women, given the opportunity to compete in varsity athletics have greater utility gains than does a male student who 
would otherwise have been given the opportunity to play, all of his life.  Because we must equate discrimination with 
equal protection, however, the proportionality requirement cannot be justified by a standard liberal civil rights model 
in which resources and rewards are distributed based on neutral principles of merit, utility, or capacity to benefit. 
 
The cases of Pederson, Neal, Alston and Horner demonstrate that proportionality is not just based on male 
and female respective enrollments.  The court in Pederson found Title IX discrimination with 49% female enrollment 
and only 29% athletic participation from females.  The decision in Neal permitted California State University to 
comply with Title IX by reducing the number of men’s wrestling scholarships, but did not base compliance with Title 
IX on the gender’s level of interest in athletics participation.  A similar court finding in Alston could not show 
discrimination under Title IX for scheduling practices which treated boy’s sports differently than girl’s sports, and did 
not allow class action certification because of the conflicts within the classes of girls.  Likewise, the Horner case was 
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unsuccessful in lobbying for fast pitch softball as a girl’s sport in high school when it was ruled that the plaintiff could 
not show a discrimination feature.  The court found that the school rational for non-sponsorship in high school was not 
focused on the girls by reason of their sex, and was not directed to them as a class.  The case analysis in both Ortez-
Del Valle and Stanley evidence how equal pay claims can pay different dividends than Title IX discrimination claims.  
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in Stanley recognized that  coaching positions for college basketball men’s programs are 
significantly different than coaching positions for women’s programs because of the media pressure and the revenue 
generating responsibility associated with coaching in a male college sport. 
 
 Proportionality is probably best justified as a perfectionist resocialization measure aimed at providing girls 
with a set of alternative viable conceptions of themselves either through the role modeling affects of having visible 
college varsity female athletics or, indirectly, through helping to change the social meanings attached to athleticism, 
specifically, and physical agency, more generally.  Proportionality is thus best justified on the grounds that it 
encourages girls to develop a set of traits, skills and possible self-conceptions that are considered important for their 
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NOTES 
